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Privatization and Performance
By MARY M. SHIRLEY*
I. Introduction
State ownership is an important phenomenon in most developing
market economies where thirteen percent of gross domestic product is
produced by state firms (compared to an average of ten percent in
developed countries). In the transitional economies of Eastern Eu-
rope, the former Soviet Union, and China, the figures are much
higher. In Czechoslovakia, for example, ninety-two percent of indus-
trial production was under state ownership in 1991.
Most governments have voiced concern about the performance of
their state firms, even where the share of state enterprises is relatively
small. Thailand, for example, has had a series of reform programs in
an effort to improve its state enterprises even though they represent
only five percent of gross domestic product. One reason for this con-
cern is that poor performance in state firms, unlike poor private per-
formance, directly affects the fiscal deficit and important choices
about public spending. A striking example of these effects is given by
the government of Mexico which estimates that the cumulative losses
of its steel mill, Sidermex, reached $10 billion by the time it was sold.
A fraction of this amount could have brought potable water and sew-
erage to every rural community in southeastern Mexico.
Efforts to improve state enterprises without privatizing owner-
ship have been disappointing. One reason is that poor performance is
directly related to governments' actions as owners. Governments
have many actors with many objectives. These actors expect state-
owned firms to seek their objectives, and profit maximization may not
be their first priority. Instead, they may expect enterprises to provide
goods at low, subsidized prices; provide job opportunities in remote
regions; or keep up employment even when production is slack.
* The author is Division Chief, Finance and Private Sector Development Diiion,
Policy Research Department, The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and cinclu-
sions are those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World
Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or
the countries they represent.
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These multiple objectives make it hard to judge outcomes and hard to
hold managers accountable for results. In addition, if the managers
are hired and paid like civil servants, and if political considerations
outweigh commercial ones in the firm's operation, then it is not sur-
prising that poor performance may result. The firm may operate
under a "soft budget," meaning that it has easy access to subsidies or
government guaranteed debt to cover its losses. This further reduces
the pressures on management to improve performance. Moreover,
governments often do not make needed investments that a private
owner would make. Privatization is viewed as one way to break the
direct link between the enterprise and the government and, in the pro-
cess, to improve performance, raise capital, and reduce the govern-
ment's exposure to commercial risk.
In many former socialist economies, privatization is seen not only
as a way to improve performance, but more importantly as a means to
change the operating rules and as an integral part of the transition to a
market economy. Privatization "aims to transfer property rights to
owners who have incentives to defend the interests of the capital they
own, and who are expected to support the painful steps necessary to
achieve a market economy. For some reformers and analysts, the pur-
pose of privatization in ex-socialist countries is more to transform so-
ciety than to put previously wasted and under-utilized assets to more
productive use."'
This paper considers the reasons why privatization is accelerating
worldwide. It then asks and answers three questions:
1. Can privatization improve economic welfare?
2. Who benefits from privatizations?
3. How can countries privatize so as to maximize the benefits?
H. Privatization Is Accelerating and Expanding
The current wave of privatizations began in the early 1980s with
the Thatcher administration's sales in the United Kingdom. (The
U.K. sold thirty major enterprises employing 800,000 people for some
$127 billion during the 1980s.) At first, privatization rhetoric outside
the U.K. far exceeded action, but in the late 1980s privatization began
to accelerate, not just in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
but also in developed and developing countries worldwide.
1. Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis, & Mary Shirley, Privatization: The Lessons of Experi-
ence in Market Economies, WoRm BANK RES. OBSERVER, July 1994, at 241.
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Today, privatization is increasing rapidly, especially in developing
countries. One study reports that the total number of privatization
transactions grew from 58 in 1988 to over 450 in 1992, while in devel-
oped countries privatizations went from 22 transactions in 1988 to 391
in 1992.2 The cash revenues from sales in developing countries
climbed from $2.6 billion in 1988 to $23 billion in 1992. In compari-
son, revenues from sales in developed countries were $17.3 billion in
1992.3 (See figure 1.) These figures actually understate the growth in
sales because they do not include East Germany, which sold over
11,000 enterprises during this period for a value of $25 billion, or the
small scale mass privatizations in Eastern Europe, which privatized
hundreds of thousands of shops, restaurants, and the like. Russia, for
example, sold 70,000 shops in the first eighteen months of its privatiza-
tion program.
The macroeconomic impact of privatization is increasing even
faster than the sales themselves, thanks to a change in the nature of
the sales. Early privatizations tended to involve small, light manufac-
turing firms, which were neither important in their own right nor sig-
nificant in their linkages to the rest of the economy.4 More recent
sales have been dominated by large infrastructure (which accounted
for thirty-five percent of the value of sales in developing countries
from 1988 to 1992).1 banks, and heavy industry. A list of recent priva-
tization transactions of over $100 million includes banks, power com-
panies, phone companies, large mines, and steel companies -
enterprises which were originally nationalized precisely because they
represented the "commanding heights" of the economy. (See figure
2.)
Why this expansion? Governments cite many reasons for priva-
tizing, among them an ideological preference for private ownership
2. Frank Sader, The Experience of Privatizations in the Developing Iorld: 1OS,-l02,
in PROCEEDINGS: THIRD ASIA PACIFIC CONFERENCE OF MANAGEM.ENT Ct ' i LT'V .Ti
(Aug. 23-26, 1993, Brisbane, Australia). Note that the study measures tranactions. not
enterprises privatized; an enterprise may be privatized through more than ucne tran:-action.
Also note that the cash revenues do not include the value of debt swaps Ur inwstmcnt
commitments, which are sometimes larger than the cash paid (as was true, for example, in
the Argentine telecommunications privatization).
3. 1&
4. See Mary Shirley & Elliot Berg, Divestiture in Developing Countrics, WoiLD
BANK DiscussIoN PAPER No. 11 (1987) (information on the size and impact of early pria-
tizations). See also Charles Vuylsteke et al., Tedniques of Privatization of State>.-.ncd
Enterprises, WoRD BAN TECHNICAL PAPER No. 88, VOL I - III (19S) (providing an
inventory of sales).
5. Sader, supra note 2.
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(U.K., Chile, and Czechoslovakia), a wish to raise public revenues and
reduce public debt (Mexico and Argentina), and a belief that priva-
tization will improve the operating efficiency of the privatized firm
(almost everywhere). But a deeper underlying reason for privatizing
is to make the economy, and hence its citizens, better off. Ultimately
the success or failure of privatization should be judged not on whether
the sale occurs, nor on whether the company is more efficient, nor
Figure 1
Global Privatizations, 1988-92
By Number of Transactions




By Amount of Revenue
Source: Sader (1993).
even on whether the privatized firm survives, but rather the test
should be whether privatization enhances economic welfare.6
6. In some cases, the economy may prosper if the privatized firm does not survive.




Recent Privatization Transactions with Value over
US$100 Million
Country Enterprise Date Trnsaction Sale Sector
Valoe(USSmo Technxgueial
Mexico Bancomer 10191 2550 Private offer Banking
Mexico Banamex 09)91 2,300 Pivate offer Banking
South Korea Korea Electric Power 06189 2,100 Pnvae offer Power
Venezuela CANTV 11191 1,8S5 Publiccffer Telecommu n c ar s
Mexico Telmex 12190 1,760 Private offer Telecommumcatz-
Brazil Usiminas 12/91 1,430 Private offer Steel
Mexico Mexicana de Cobre 10183 1,360 Private offer Mining
Argentina ENTEL 11/90 1,244 Private offer Telecr .un= atiaa;
Malaysia Telekom Malalsia 10190 861 Publicffer Telc .ammum=cas
Mexico Cananea 09/90 475 Private offer Mining
Mexico Aerovias deMexico 11188 339 Private offer Airline
Philippines Nonoc 10190 325 Pnvate offer Kruing
Taiwan (China) China Steel 04189 285 Publikcfer Steel
Mexico BancaCremi 06191 243 Private offer Banking
Mexico Multibanco deMercantil 06191 204 Private offer Banking
Mexico Banpais 06191 182 Private offer Banking
Mexico Sicaxtsa 1 11191 170 Private offer Steel
Chile Compania de Telefonos 01(83 170 Private offer Telezomminnati=on
Mexico Sidermex North 11/91 145 Priate offer Steel
Venezuela VIASA 09191 145 Private offer AirLne
Mexico Mexicanade Aviacion 06189 140 Private offer Airline
Brazil Aracruz 05183 130 Public cIfer Pulp and paper
Turkey Petkim 06/90 125 PubIic iffer Petrochenrcal
Hungary Tungsram 05189 110 Private offer Electnal equirnent
Mexico Nikko Hotel 10188 110 Private offer Hc.tel
Mexico Tereftalos Mexicanos 11188 106 Private offer Chenucal
Colombia Papelcol 08/90 100 Private offer Pulp and paper
Souise- Kikei et al (1993).
Note: (a) does not include sales sbsequent to fast tansacion (e-g. emnlnyee c fWa, B :tcrca1 p, ' c'ffe, M c
debt-equity sMap compones.
111. Can Privatization Enhance Economic Welfare?
Neoclassical economic theory does not give a role to ownership.
And, until recently, empirical studies of public versus private enter-
prises have been inconclusive. The studies suggest that private firms
outperform public enterprises only when they operate in more com-
petitive markets, leading analysts to suggest that competition, not
tional prices. This means that if their inputs and outputs are priced at world market values,
the value of their output is less than the costs of their inputs; the more they produce, the
worse off is the economy.
1994]
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ownership, is the key to better performance.7 This reasoning would
argue that governments should privatize only if markets function rea-
sonably well and there are no significant market failures, and they
should focus first on expanding competition.' But much of the experi-
ence of the last two decades shows that in practice markets and public
ownership have proved to be linked in ways that can work to reduce
competition, even in the absence of a significant market failure.
For example, because state enterprise losses can have an impact
on the public budget and debt, governments often intervene to protect
high cost state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition, giving
them subsidies or privileged access to finance. To the extent that the
high costs of SOEs are the result of government imposed burdens
(which is often the case), the sense of obligation to protect them from
competition is heightened. These burdens may be social (maintaining
employment and developing backward regions), political (providing
jobs and power to certain groups), or rent seeking (commandeering
state enterprise profits for private gains). Regardless of the cause, the
result of such interventions is that state ownership, created to over-
come or correct market failure, aggravates or perpetuates it. In such
cases, privatization enhances competition, since it reduces the govern-
ment's direct stake in protecting particular industries. And, in fact,
some of those who argue that it is competition, not ownership, which
improves performance, support privatization of potentially competi-
tive firms because it can often be an important part of market
liberalization. 9
Recent evidence, however, indicates that privatization is more
than just a tool to support competition. A study of three companies in
each of four countries (Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and the United King-
dom) found that privatization enhanced economic welfare in eleven of
7. See, e.g., DIETER Bos, PRIVATIZATION: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1991) (for surveys of performance). See also Thoma3 Borcherding et al.,
Comparing the Efficiency of Private and Public Production: A Survey of the Evidence from
Five Federal States, J. ECON. (April 1989); Pankaj Tandon, The Efficiency of Privatized
Firms: Evidence and Implications (Oct., 1993) (unpublished document, on file with author)
(for the view that competition, not ownership, matters).
8. A less common observation is that where markets function reasonably well, so do
public enterprises (usually). A government able to reduce distortions and to open markets
is more likely to be willing and able to select and motivate good public managers who
foster better performance. Kikeri et al., supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., Tandon, supra note 7; Richard Hemming & Ali M. Mansoor, Privatiza-
tion and Public Enterprises, IMF OCCASIONAL PAPER, No. 56 (Jan. 1988).
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the twelve cases, even where market structures did not change.10 (See
figure 3.) In some cases productivity improved (telecommunications
in the U.K., Mexico, and Chile; a Malaysian container port; and a
Mexican airline); and in others, a dramatic rise in investment im-
proved the welfare of the country (Chilean and U.K. telecommunica-
tions and a Malaysian airline). For instance, the Chilean
telecommunications company doubled its number of lines in three
years - an investment which the government said it would not have
made. Privatization was at the root of these gains by bringing new
capital as well as new management with new incentives.
Privatization can benefit the economy in other important ways.
For example, the Mexican privatization program generated $20 billion
in revenues - over $6 billion from the sale of the telecommunications
company (Telmex) alone. These funds were used to reduce the gov-
ernment's domestic debt, which contributed to a fall in interest rates
(from sixty-seven percent to twenty-two percent) and inflation (from
fifty-two percent to twenty percent) and a surge in confidence in the
economy. New investment, part of it returning flight capital, helped
double economic growth from two to four percent." (See figure 4.)
Privatization can also enhance the credibility of a government's
commitment to liberalization and private development. Unlike trade
reforms or price liberalization, which can be undone at the stroke of a
pen, privatization means a major rewrite of the economic rules of the
game. It is hard to undo, partly because the sales create new stake-
holders in the redivision of property. When shares in privatized firms
are widely distributed, as in Chile and Eastern Europe for example,
the number of new stakeholders may be large indeed.
IV. Who Benefits? What About Labor?
One criticism of privatization is that the economic gains may not
be widely distributed and that some, labor in particular, will lose. At
first glance, the impact of privatization on labor might not seem to be
10. AHMED GALAL ET AI... THE WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF SELLING Putic- E-.
TERPRISES: CASE STUDIES FROM CHILE, MALAYSIA, MEXICO AND THE U.K. (1994). This
study compared the performance of privatized firms with how the firms would have per-
formed had they remained public. The methodology controlled for variables other than
privatization that might influence results. It measured the overall welfare impact of pnva-
tization on the economy as well as the distribution of the gains and losses among economic
actors (government, buyers, labor, customers) and the sources of the welfare changes (e.g.,
price changes, productivity improvements, investment).
11. Id.; Florencio L6pez-de-Silanes, Determinants of Privatization Prices (Sept. 1993)
(unpublished document, on file with author).
1994]
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Figure 3
Privatization gains and losses
-10 0 20 40

















i [ J Domesir
- . U. .F. .ign
14%
- l ~
Source: Galal, et al. - Amual welfwr gain as % ofamual salcs in lat year tefmn pdvatizaft.
a very important issue since public enterprises are not major employ-
ers in most market economies.12 In thirty market economies, seven of
them developed, public enterprise employment is less than twelve per-
cent of the total labor force. In eighty-four percent of these countries,
it is less than five percent of the labor force. 13 The figures go up if you
exclude agricultural employment, but even then public enterprise em-
ployment still does not represent a significant portion of the labor
force. This is not surprising since there is a tendency everywhere for
12. The situation is obviously very different in centrally planned economies in transi-
tion where most people work in state enterprises. These economies are beyond the scope
of this paper.












* Average cost of funds of Banco de Mexico
Source: Pankaj Tandon, "Mexico", in Galal et al (1994).
public ownership to focus on large, capital-intensive enterprises, while
small labor-intensive activities tend universally to be private.
14
Nevertheless, state enterprises cannot be privatized without re-
gard to the effects on employment. While the sector as a whole is
highly capital-intensive, some state enterprises - railways are the
most notable example - are major employers. Because state enter-
prises tend to be large, layoffs can cause a lumpiness in unemployment
that cannot be ignored. Not only may a large number of people be
suddenly thrown into the job market, but unemployment may also be
regionally concentrated. Moreover, because state enterprise workers
are trained for highly capital-intensive jobs, it may not be easy for
them to find comparable employment at a comparable wage in the
private sector.
14. Because state enterprises are so capital intensive, an expansion in the state-owned
enterprise sector generates less employment than a comparable expansion in the private
sector. A study of Brazil, for example, found that a one million cruzeiro increase in sales
creates 77% more jobs in private firms than in state-owned firms. See Benedict Clements,
State Enterprise and Employment Generation in Brazil, in ECONOMIc DEVELOFMSEN1T AND
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Privatization is expected to result in layoffs because state enter-
prises are assumed to be over-staffed, especially in developing coun-
tries. For example, public ports have been estimated to be sixty-four
percent over staffed in Uruguay, seventy percent in Ghana, and eighty
percent in Argentina. 15 The Sri Lanka Cement Corporation produced
189 tons of cement per employee in 1989 compared to 350 to 1460
tons in other plants in Asia, and a world average between 1200 and
1500.16 Prior to privatization, the Argentine steel company, Somisa,
required approximately two and a half times the number of man hours
to produce a ton of steel as the international industry average.1 7 The
Mexican telecommunications company, Telmex, had twice the number
of workers per line as U.S. telephone companies.
Over-staffing is more likely in the public than in the private sec-
tor. Since state companies can finance their losses through govern-
ment subsidies or government guaranteed debt, they are less
concerned about the costs of redundant workers. Furthermore, gov-
ernments are more sensitive than private employers to the political
repercussions of layoffs of state workers. State enterprise workers are
organized, informed, and politically active; they can be formidable op-
ponents of efforts to downsize their companies.
It is this over-staffing which is the root cause of layoffs. Any ef-
fort to reduce losses and increase efficiency, even under public owner-
ship, has to reduce redundancies. Privatization makes layoffs more
likely because it eliminates the enterprises' access to the government
budget, creating pressures for productivity improvements. At the
same time, privatization reduces opposition by making financing avail-
able for severance pay and shares available for retained workers.
Although the argument that layoffs usually accompany privatiza-
tion seems unassailable, the facts do not support it. A study of sixty-
one companies in eighteen countries (six developed and twelve indus-
trial) found that two-thirds of the companies surveyed employed more
15. Alice Galenson, Labor Redundancy in the Transport Sector: A Review, World
Bank Infrastructure and Urban Development Department Discussion Paper, Table 1.3
(Jan. 1989) (unpublished document, on file with author).
16. Ariel Fiszbein, Eliminating Labor Redundancy in SOE: Sri Lanka, WORLD BANK
INTERNAL PAPER, No. INV36 (Dec. 1992).
17. Measured against an international average steel-maker benchmark. Reynold
Mooney & Scott Griffith, Privatizing a Distressed State.Owned Enterprise: Lessons
Learned Through Privatization Work in Argentina's Steel Sector, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.,
Spring 1993, at 36-44.
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workers after their transfer to private ownership than before." A
study of Mexican privatized firms in 1988 found that at most only five
percent of the pre-privatization work force had been laid off and some
companies had actually increased employment after privatization. For
example, the Mexican auto-parts industry expanded by thirty
percent.19
An important explanation as to why privatization may not result
in layoffs is that private buyers plan to invest and expand, and so they
are willing to keep on excess workers in the hope that they can be
productively employed in the future. This seems to be at work in the
Telmex privatization where, despite over-staffing, there have been no
layoffs (nor was the company sold at a deep discount to induce the
buyers to keep the level of employment up). Rather, the buyers plan
massive new investments that will eventually eliminate redundancies
and bring the company up to world standards of labor productivity.
The evidence that privatization may actually increase employ-
ment does not, of course, mean that layoffs do not occur. When lay-
offs do occur, the important question is: what happens to the workers?
Research on the welfare effects of the sales of twelve companies in the
U.K., Malaysia, Mexico, and Chile found that labor had net gains in
all twelve cases.2" In most of these cases workers were not laid off
(workforce reduction occurred only through attrition or slower
growth in the labor force), and when layoffs did occur, those workers
who were laid off were compensated enough to offset the loss of their
jobs in the judgment of the researchers.2
There is case-study evidence that the severance pay arrangements
that accompany privatization tend to be generous." For example, the
severance payments for the Mexican airline, Aeromexico, were equal
to a year's wages, seemingly ample time to find new employment.
British Airways, which laid off 4,600 employees after privatization, set
aside £20,000 per employee for severance pay. One compensation
package used in Sri Lanka paid workers as much as eighty percent
18. William Megginson et al., The Financial and Operating Performance of Ncalyy-
Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis, J. FN., June 1994, at 403-452.
19. GALAL Er AL, supra note 10.
20. See id
21. This was a subjective judgment since it was based on how much unemployed time
the pay would cover and the likelihood of being rehired during that period, rather than on
the actual outcome for laid-off workers.
22. Severance pay is excessively generous in some cases. Ghana's state enterprises
agreed to union contracts that specified severance pa)ments four to seven times the coun-
try's GNP per capita.
19941
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more than their estimated opportunity cost of being unemployed -
close to three and a half years' salary.'
Privatization can also benefit those who remain employed, partic-
ularly through share discounts and purchase schemes. A survey found
thirty-three developing countries had some provision for employee
share ownership during privatization. 24 Share discounts ranged from
ten to seventy-five percent of the purchase price, usually on ten to
twenty percent of the company's shares, plus free giveaways.2 5 The
employees of British Telecom, for example, got fifty-four shares free,
a ten percent discount on any additional shares bought, and for every
additional share bought, received two more free shares.
Share purchases can translate into substantial gains. The Na-
tional Freight Corporation (NFC) was sold to employees with interest
free loans of £200 available for each employee to purchase shares.
NFC's employees gained close to £200 million on their shares and
were the main beneficiaries of the sale. In Mexico, government-
owned banks loaned the union $325 million to purchase 4.4 percent of
Telmex shares, which in 1992 were worth $1.4 billion, or $20,000 per
worker.26
Besides benefitting workers in the enterprises, privatizations and
the accompanying macroeconomic reforms can help stimulate the rest
of the economy, and thus help improve employment opportunities in
general. Argentina, for example, prepared for privatization by laying
off 125,000 workers from public enterprises between 1989 and 1992
(plus another 125,000 civil servants). Yet the unemployment rate fell
over the same period from 8.8 percent to 5.4 percent. One plausible
explanation for the drop in unemployment is that the reforms, of
which privatization was an integral part, improved the private invest-
ment climate and thus helped to increase the availability of jobs.
23. Opportunity cost was calculated taking into account how many more employed
years the laid off worker might have, the likelihood of finding new employment in a given
period of time (which increases until age thirty and falls after age forty-nine), and the
publid/private wage differential. For example, the company, Leather Corporation, paid
workers who had joined them at age twenty almost 41.5 monthly salaries in compensation,
almost double the estimated opportunity cost of 22.6 monthly salaries. In contrast, a gov-
ernment commission proposed a less generous package which would have given the same
worker only 14.1 monthly salaries. Fiszbein, supra note 16.
24. Stephen C. Smith, Employee Ownership in Privatization in Developing and Re-
forming Countries (World Bank, Aug. 1992) (unpublished document, on file with author).
25. Russia and Khazakstan permit thirty percent of a firm's shares to be discounted.
26. GALAL ET AL., supra note 10.
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V. Who Else Benefits or Loses? What about Government
and Consumers?
A real concern in privatizations is that the government will be a
bad negotiator and will lose on the deal. Determining whether a gov-
ernment gains or loses is not easy. In theory, a government will break
even on a sale if the sale price is equivalent to the net present value of
any future income from the firm plus the scrap value of the assets. In
such a case, the government is just swapping future income for the
present sale price. The government will do better than break even if
the privatized firm pays more in taxes than the state firm would have,
which will occur if it is more efficient. For example, a Malaysian lot-
tery paid three times more in taxes after privatization than the state
lottery had.27 A government does even better if the privatization
stimulates the economy more broadly and causes a general rise in
revenues. However, because the gains to the government may come
some time after the privatization and may be an indirect result of the
sale, it can be hard to measure the benefits. The calculation of the
gains is further complicated by the fact that the value of the firm is
hard to measure and is usually overestimated. For example, a Costa
Rican aluminum mill was originally valued at $52 million based on
book value. Later, it was revalued using a comparator mill in Vene-
zuela at $8 million, and it finally sold for only $4 million, a fraction of
its original value.
The twelve case studies mentioned earlier have been the only ef-
forts to construct a counterfactual and to measure the performance of
privatized firms against how they would have performed had they re-
mained public. These studies found that governments either benefit-
ted or lost by only very small amounts in all twelve cases. (The study
did not attempt to determine whether privatization led to any broader
revenue benefits thanks to its role in a general economic recovery.)
As for buyers, there is no doubt that they typically benefit from
privatization. The benefit to the buyer is an important reason for
privatization to happen in the first place. It is possible, looking back-
wards, to determine whether the buyer paid too much or too little for
the firm. In other words, we can compare how the net present value
of the firm today compares with the price originally paid. This was
done for three sales in Chile, where the buyers, with perfect hindsight,
27. Id.
1994]
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should have paid more than they did.28 Specifically, the sale price for
one electricity-generating company was sixty-five percent of what it
would be worth today, the telephone company's sale price was fifty-
one percent of its estimated worth, and an electricity distribution com-
pany's price (Enersis) was only twenty-nine percent of its value.
However, there are two problems with this approach. First, any sensi-
ble buyer will attach a risk premium to the discount rate. What we
know with perfect hindsight is not very relevant to a buyer's decision
when there are many unknowns. Second, a country's welfare may im-
prove even if the government does not maximize sale prices. For ex-
ample, in the case of Enersis mentioned above, the government
received $5.6 billion less than the present value of the company, but
because the new private managers reduced losses and passed the sav-
ings on to consumers in the form of lower prices, consumers were bet-
ter off by $17.5 billion. 29
What about consumers? In sales of utilities, prices usually go up
after privatization. From an economist's perspective this is a good
thing, since prices move toward their efficiency price - in other
words, a price that reflects the scarcity value of the good or service.
This is good because it means that people will not waste scarce re-
sources. But from the perspective of the consumer, this is a loss of
income. Some of the ways in which consumers benefit - for example,
more reliable electricity service, quicker dial tone, prompt action on
complaints - are intangible and hard to measure. Nevertheless,
there have been cases of direct and measurable benefits to consumers,
as in the case of Enersis3
28. The calculation extrapolated performance under private ownership into the future
and discounted the net benefits using an appropriate discount factor for Chile today - 10
percent. See L
29. One way for governments to improve their returns is to retain a block of non-
voting shares and to sell them later when the performance of the firm has improved. This
strategy only works if improved economic circumstances, better management, and new
investment improve the value of the firm over time. The strategy can backfire if the buyer,
concerned about whether the government may use its remaining shares as an excuse to
intervene, offers a lower initial price, or if the overhang of shares keeps stock prices low.
30. Similarly, the value of new investment has been estimated based on the levels of
unsatisfied demand and the benefits of being able to call and be called. In Chile the expan-
sion of the phone company, which doubled the number of lines in five years, was estimated
to benefit consumers by a net present value of over 500 billion Chilean Pesos. GALAL UT
AL., supra note 10.
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VI. How to Do it: Preconditions for Successful Privatization
The benefits cited above are not automatic results of privatiza-
tion. Privatization must be done properly to succeed. Studies of suc-
cessful privatizations show four important lessons: (1) create the right
environment; (2) design a sales process that will not sacrifice effi-
ciency for short-term gains; (3) break up monopolies before sale; and
(4) regulate monopolies to encourage efficiency and investment.
A. Create the Right Environment
Successful privatizers, such as Chile and Mexico, started introduc-
ing reforms in their macroeconomic policies and public sectors well
before privatization. Chile, for example, reduced tariffs to ten percent
across the board, eliminated the budget deficit through tax reforms
and expenditure cutbacks, and introduced a stabilization program that
brought inflation down from 380 percent in 1974 to 38 percent in
1979.31 Such reforms "help ensure that privatization will attract pri-
vate investors and expand competition and productive efficiency,
rather than simply transfer rents from SOEs to private owners." -
Financial reforms are also key. First of all, a well-functioning,
competitive financial system mobilizes capital from a wide variety of
savers to finance the purchase of privatized firms as well as providing
for subsequent investment in the privatized firms. It also generates
information about the companies and helps to pressure managers to
act in the best interests of the shareholders. Recent research has
found that successful privatizations were closely correlated w ith finan-
cial depth, development of the stock market, the independence of the
banking sector, and the private ownership of banks.33 However, this
does not mean that privatization must await stock market develop-
ment. In fact, most sales in market economies have not relied on
stock markets. Countries such as Chile and Argentina have been able
to use privatization to help expand their stock markets, while others,
notably Czechoslovakia, have been able to distribute shares widely
without a formal market.
31. See Vittorio Corbo, Economic Reforms in Chile: An Oveniew (Mar. 31, 1993)
(paper presented to the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, Washington, D.C., on
file with author).
32. Kikeri et al., supra note 1.
33. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, The Financial System and Public Enterprise
Reform: Concepts and Cases (World Bank, Dec. 1993) (unpublished document, on file
with author).
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Chile is a good example of the importance of the right environ-
ment, including a properly regulated financial system. Chile priva-
tized first from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. During this first
phase, Chile began by privatizing state banks through public bids to
buyers with minimum down payments as low as twenty percent of the
purchase price. Conglomerates were able to make highly leveraged
purchases of banks, and then use the banks' assets to bid on nonfinan-
cial firms. As a result, groups with very small capital bases were able
to gain control of a large volume of assets. Banking regulation was
weak and did not prevent banks from making loans to enterprises
purchased by their conglomerate. Loans from banks to enterprises
that were part of the same conglomerate reached fifteen percent of
the outstanding loans of most of Chile's pivate banks; for the largest
bank in Chile such loans reached forty percent. When Chile went into
a recession in the mid-1980s, and a number of industrial enterprises
could not repay their loans, it triggered a banking crisis requiring gov-
ernment intervention.
34
The Chilean government resold the banks and firms during the
late 1980s; but this time the government limited the shares that indi-
vidual investors could purchase, used a variety of different sales meth-
ods (stocks, public auctions, and direct sales to employees), and
prevented conglomerates from buying enterprises for debt. It also
strengthened banking regulations and controlled bank lending to re-
lated enterprises.
B. Design a Sales Process That Will Not Sacrifice Efficiency for
Short-Term Gains
Efficiency may be the loser if governments focus only on maxi-
mizing revenues. If the process is corrupt, it is even more likely to
suffer. A transparent, competitive, and well-managed process is more
likely to produce buyers with a stake in improving the firm. A well-
managed process does not mean a large one; Mexico sold hundreds of
enterprises with only seven people. The privatization unit assumed
control of an enterprise as soon as it was approved for sale. This gave
the unit the power to lay off workers, change managers, and restruc-
ture finances if necessary. It relied heavily on outside expertise,
mainly Mexican banks, but the decision-making process was central-
ized in the economic cabinet of the government. The unit usually
34. See Rolf Luders, Privatization in Chile: Objectives, Economic Environment, and
Results (Mar. 31, 1993) (on file with author).
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used competitive sealed bids, trying to assure that they had at least
three bidders. Bidders were prequalified to exclude criminals, govern-
ment officials, or others with insider knowledge or conflicts of interest
and - in the case of large natural monopolies like Telmex - to as-
sure that the technical partner was capable of managing the asset
properly.
35
C. Break up Monopolies Before Sale
The break up of monopolies is an important part of a well-man-
aged sales process. In developing economies, and especially in former
socialist countries, public firms have often held privileged monopoly
positions. They can prevent new entry, perpetuate their inefficiencies,
and exploit consumers if privatized "as is." Trade liberalization alone
may not be enough to foster competition in tradeables if control over
the distribution networks remains concentrated and firms remain ver-
tically integrated. The opportunities to increase competition are
many, even in natural monopolies. In telecommunications, for exam-
ple, privatizing governments have split off equipment production, cel-
lular telephones, and value-added services as separate competitive
subsectors. Splitting ownership of production from delivery systems
can be another way to promote competition. Chile, for example, split
up electricity generation and transmission and created eleven genera-
tion companies. All power producers are guaranteed access to the
grid, including manufacturing firms with their own generators.
In contrast, the U.K. sold its telecommunication and gas indus-
tries as monopolies with the privatized company owning the delivery
network. As a consequence, "potential competitors were faced with
the prospect of going cap in hand to these dominant companies to ask
for access to the systems they needed."-6
D. Regulate Monopolies to Encourage Efficiency and Investment
Of course, some natural monopolies cannot be made competitive
and yet they may still be appropriate for privatization. Regulating
privatized monopolies can be tricky, but rewarding. Recent research
has shown that the effectiveness of regulation depends on designing
policies which are a good fit with the country's institutions and poli-
35. See Kikeri et. al., supra note 1 (for more on the sales process).
36. James McKinnon, Lessons from Privatization of the Public Sector The British En-
ergy Privatization Process, in PnocEDnnwos: TH IRD ASIA PACIC CON EPNCE OF MAN.
AGEMENT CONSULTANIS (Aug. 23-26, 1993, Brisbane, Australia).
19941
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tics.37 Regulatory schemes that give an independent regulator a lot of
discretion can discourage investors, particularly in countries where
there are few checks on governmental actions and weak protection of
property rights. For example, RPI-X price cap regulation, which was
introduced in the U.K., encourages the owner to improve efficiency,
but gives the independent regulator a lot of discretion.3" The owner
has an incentive to improve efficiency because the utility can capture
the profits above X for as long as X remains the same. The regulator
has the freedom to change X when he or she deems it appropriate,
which forces the utility to share its gains with consumers.
While RPI-X is theoretically very appealing, few developing
countries have the institutions that can provide investors with a credi-
ble commitment that the regulator will not reduce prices to eliminate
all profits. This system works in the U.K. because there are other in-
stitutions - the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the Secre-
tary of State for Trade and Industry - that must agree to any decision
of the regulator to which the utility objects. In developing countries,
such as Jamaica for example, giving a regulator such freedom would
probably discourage most investors from buying a privatized utility.
Jamaica built a specific set of price regulations for its telecommunica-
tions company into the utility's operating license. This worked be-
cause the utility could appeal to the courts if the regulator abused his
or her power, and the Jamaican court system allows appeal to the
Privy Council in London which reduces the influence of politics on
judicial decisions.
Chile was able to privatize its telecommunications company and
attract considerable private investment by developing a regulatory
system based on specific rules. Using clear, fair, but complex bench-
mark regulations, the regulators fostered efficient performance with
very clear limits on their discretion.3 9 The drawback to this approach
37. Brian Levy & Pablo Spiller, Regulations, Institutions and Commitment in Tele-
communications: A Comparative Analysis of Five Country Studies (World Bank, Apr.
1993) (unpublished document, on file with author).
38. Under RPI-X price cap regulation, the utility's price is allowed to increase by the
retail price index minus X, an unspecified improvement in efficiency.
39. Chile's regulators start with the long-run marginal cost of each type of telecommu-
nications service for a benchmark firm which is assumed to be working at best practice.
Using the capital-asset pricing model, they estimate the risk-adjusted earnings of a compet-
itive firm based on the time of the calculation. They combine the long-run marginal cost
and targeted rate of return to produce a detailed, maximum price schedule for an efficient
firm. These become the maximum prices that prevail in the regulated segments of the
market. See Ahmed Galal, Regulations, Commitment and Development of Telccommunica-
tions in Chile, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER, No. 1278 (March 1994).
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is that it requires considerable administrative skills to develop and ap-
ply the complex benchmark regulations. Many countries may have to
develop less ambitious regulations suited to their own institutional
setting.
VII. Conclusion
Privatization, properly done, can increase economic welfare. But
not everyone necessarily gains, nor are the gains necessarily shared
evenly. Some governments are in a position to improve the equity of
privatization by retaining shares to sell later, by expanding competi-
tion during the sale, and by assuring equitable treatment of workers
and consumers. A competitive environment, a developed and well-
regulated financial system, a well-managed sales process that is trans-
parent and competitive, the break up of monopolies prior to sale, and
careful regulation of those firms that cannot be made to compete are
all ways to improve the benefits of privatization. While these actions
are by no means simple, they are not impossible, as the experience of
a number of successful privatizers has shown. Other studies have
shown that managing a state enterprise well is at least as difficult as
privatizing well and probably harder because management reforms
are so hard to sustain.' Good state enterprise performance requires a
new contract between the state and its firm's managers - a contract
which must be periodically renewed and which is subject to strong
political pressures to renege with few penalties for non-compliance.
In contrast, privatization rewrites the rules of the relationship be-
tween enterprise and government in a way that is harder to overturn
because the new private owners have a strong stake in the independ-
ent operation of their enterprise.
41
40. See MARY M. SIRLEY & JOHN NET S, PUBLIC ENIERPRISE REFORM%: THE LUS.
SONS OF EXPERIENCE (1991).
41. See Mary M. Shirley, Public Enterprise Reforn: Lessons from the Past and Issues
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